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           Abstract 
 
Existing unemployment insurance systems in many OECD countries involve a ceiling on 
insurable earnings. The result is lower replacement rate for employees with relatively high 
earnings. This paper examines whether replacement rates should decrease as the level of 
earnings rises. The framework is a search equilibrium model where wages are determined by 
Nash bargaining between firms and workers, job search intensity is endogenous and workers 
are heterogeneous. The analysis suggests higher replacement rates for low-paid workers if 
taxes are uniform. The same result may hold when taxes are redistributive. Numerical 
simulations indicate that there are modest welfare gains associated with moving from an 
optimal uniform benefit system to an optimally differentiated one in both cases, i.e., uniform 
and redistributive taxation. The case for differentiation arises from the fact that it may have 
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1. Introduction 
The process of industrialization created new kinds of risks such as mass unemployment and 
income uncertainty. The uncertain employment prospects together with risk averse individuals 
resulted in the provision of unemployment insurance (UI) in order to mitigate the risks.
1While 
the earliest forms of UI were developed by trade unions in Great Britain in 1832, France was 
the first state providing this kind of social protection in 1905. 
 
However, there are other reasons except demand for income security behind the public 
provisions of UI. Unemployment benefits enable the unemployed person to spend sufficient 
time to search for a job that matches his skill level, whereas lack of income can force the 
unemployed to take a job which does not match his skill. In this case the existence of UI 
increases labour market efficiency and reduces the cost of search for the unemployed. 
Moreover, improved matching of workers to vacant jobs may reduce the probability of future 
spells of unemployment. At the same time, employers are likely to find it easier to dismiss 
workers under a UI regime, since workers will tend to demand less compensation for losing 
jobs. It will allow employers to adopt methods of production with higher risk of redundancy. 
In addition, the willingness of workers to be mobile is likely to be greater under a UI regime. 
 
However, UI may have adverse incentive effects. More generous UI benefits may increase 
unemployment by reducing search effort
2and/or increasing wage pressure.
3 On the other hand, 
the existence of insurance schemes increases the incentive for uninsured to find employment 
in order to become eligible for future benefits.
4 But this entitlement effect may imply that the 
unqualified individuals accept the first offered job that does not match their skill. 
  
From a social perspective,  an effective system of income protection for the unemployed 
reduces divisions in society and provides some form of justice to people who lose their jobs 
through no fault of their own; from a macroeconomic perspective, it stabilises purchasing 
power and so the demand for goods and services.  
 
Despite these facts protection against the financial risk of unemployment developed later than 
provision for other circumstances
5 (industrial accident, old age pension, health, and family 
                                                                 
1 Agell (2000). 
2 See Baily (1978), Flemming (1978),  Shavell and Weiss (1979). 
3 Johnson and Layard (1986). 
4 Mortensen (1977). 
5 Alber (1981), Alber and Flora (1981), Flora (1987) and Tsukada (2002).   2
allowance). However, UI is now  not only an integral part of the social welfare system, it is 
also one of the most important institutions of social insurance in most advanced economies. 
 
Over the past couple of decades, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to the 
economic analysis of the impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment. Since the 
emergence of job-search theory
6, economists have got an effective analytical tool for labour 
market analysis. This has resulted in a large amount of theoretical and empirical research. 
Today, although the theory of job search
7 is a young actor on the stage of labour market 
analysis, it plays a major part in the economics of labour. It may be one of the reasons that 
labour economics and the institutions and rules that govern labour markets have moved from 
the periphery to the centre of economic discourse.
8 
 
Another reason behind the considerable attention in research about UI benefit systems, and 
the most important reason in my opinion, is the rise in unemployment in the most OECD 
countries during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s and its persistence in most countries. In the 
European union there are about 27 million people unemployed or would be willing to sign up 
for a job if labour market prospects improved. Furthermore, half of the unemployed has been 
out of work for more than one year.
9 
 
Various aspects have been explored e.g. the relationship between benefit levels and the 
duration of unemployment, the impact of benefit duration on unemployment duration, and the 
linkages between UI through job search and labour supply.
10 Put differently, there has been a 
considerable attention to explore rational individual behaviour during unemployment. 
However, there are still areas that have not been developed. Despite the voluminous literature 
on this topic, there is in fact relatively little attention paid to the relationship between the 
structure of UI benefit system and unemployment. The following analysis is a first step 
towards a theoretical evaluation of this aspect. 
 
                                                                 
6 A rigorous and detailed analysis of the impact of UI on individual job search behaviour under imperfect 
information was first provided by Dale Mortensen (1977). 
7 Another key feature of the theory is that it tries to describe the behaviour of unemployed individuals in a 
dynamic, ever changing and uncertain environment since the certain and static environments used by previous 
models could not represent many of life’s real work experiences.  
8 See Freeman (1998). 
9 See Munzi and Salomäki (1999). 
10 For a more detailed discussion of the development of UI in theory and practice see Holmlund (1998), Devine 
and Kiefer (1991) and Atkinson and Mickelwright (1991).     3
 All OECD countries have schemes for the specific purpose of paying benefits to unemployed 
persons, and even though these schemes differ widely from one country to another, the benefit 
level in most countries has a maximum. Income support for workers is usually based on one 
of two principles (or both): insurance or assistance. Assistance payments, available to 
unemployed that are not qualified for insurance benefit, are usually not related to past 
contributions, though they may vary with age, marital status and number of children. 
 
The insurance-type schemes are quite often unrelated to family circumstances and generally 
related to previous earnings in employment and based on one of two principles: either the 
amount of benefit is fixed on a flat-rate basis (Beveridgean); or it is proportional to the wage 
(Bismarckian).
11 While most countries in EU have wage-related UI benefit system, the UK 
has flat-rate benefit system since 1982. In practice, however, compensation schemes can 
involve both principles. At the same time, a ceiling imposed on benefits can substantially 
reduce the proportion of previous income received. This paper focuses on this aspect of 
earnings-related benefits schemes. 
 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the optimal structure of replacement rates in a search 
equilibrium framework along the lines of Pissarides (2000). The model allows for endogenous 
search effort among unemployed workers. Wages are assumed to be endogenous as in 
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), but benefit payments are indefinite, which means that 
there is no risk of loosing benefits for unemployed workers. There are two types of workers, 
where one type is more productive and therefore receives a higher wage. Furthermore, 
replacement rates are allowed to be different. We find that the optimal system is characterised 
by lower replacement rates for workers with higher wages if taxes are uniform. In the case of 
redistributive taxation, the same result may hold under certain condition.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the system o f 
unemployment insurance in the OECD countries. Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of 
the model. Section 4 derives some analytical results concerning the properties of the optimal 
replacement rates. In section 5 of the paper I present the numerical results concerning the 
optimal replacement rates and finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                                 
11 OECD (1999).   4
2. Earnings-Related UI in Practice 
Within the OECD the replacement rates for unemployed vary substantially. The designs of UI 
reflect national values and norms. Each country has built its own system with its own specific 
national features, and there is not any common form of UI system in OECD countries. The 
regulation of unemployment insurance is often very complicated. These facts make it difficult 
to rank the systems according to some criteria. 
 
 Generally, a minimum period of insured employment is required to qualify for UI benefits. 
This period ranges from 10.5 weeks in Canada to 108 weeks in Portugal. The initial rate of 
benefit ranges from 40 to 90 percent of previous earnings. The benefit rate is related to gross 
earnings with the exception of Germany, where the payment rates are expressed as a 
percentage of net income. UI benefits are taxed in most countries but not in Germany, 
Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Japan, Korea, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Only in 
Belgium is UI unlimited in duration. Payment rates decrease over time in several countries, 
e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Hungry and Norway. The payment rates can depend 
on age, family situation, employment record and previous earnings.
12 However, despite the 
complexity and diversity of national unemployment insurance arrangements
13 that results in a 
wide diversity in coverage and organisation of UI,
14 there are some common characteristics 
shared across countries in OECD.  
 
Unemployment insurance schemes are generally of a compulsory nature for the majority of 
countries, with Denmark and Sweden as exceptions. Furthermore, the state is involved in 
establishing the regulation of UI schemes, although government participation in financing 
insurance schemes differs a great deal from one country to another. 
 
                                                                 
12 OECD (1999). 
13 Unemployment insurance differs, like social insurance, even between most advanced economies. Esping-
Andersen (1990) discusses three different types of welfare capitalism in 18 advanced economies with three types 
of social policy regimes. Leibfried (1993) found a fourth type including Portugal, Spain and Greece. Historically, 
there are also differences between these countries about the establishment and development of the welfare state. 
While the German social insurance system had established by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s, the 
passage of the Social Security Act as a result of president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1935 launched 
the American federal welfare state. See Leman (1980) and Brooks (1893).     
14 A comparison of different studies about net replacement rates of the unemployed in EU countries shows that 
there are three similar groups of countries with high, intermediate and low replacement rates. The high 
replacement rates are noticed in Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, the 
intermediate one in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom and the low one in Greece, Ireland 
and Italy. Note that these studies are about the “net” rate of unemployment benefits where taxes and family-
related benefits are included. See Munzi and Salomäki (1999).     5
 Finally, the general character of the UI schemes in most OECD countries is that they contain 
income-related benefits, i.e., the level of benefit paid is at least partially earnings-related in 
most OECD countries. The exceptions are Iceland, Ireland, Korea, Poland and the United 
Kingdom, where benefits are unrelated to previous income.
15 
 
Thus, either there is a ceiling on insurable earnings, as in most OECD countries, which fixes 
the insurance benefit at the same level for a large proportion of the unemployed; or the 
amount of benefit is fixed on a flat-rate basis. The latter point means that unemployment 
insurance rarely operates as a pure insurance scheme. There is some major deviation from the 
basic principles of insurance. One reason is presumably that there is a desire to introduce 
some redistribution within the group of insured individuals. Such redistribution, which 
depends on criteria other than the occurrence of the risk insured against, is typically to the 
advantages of the low paid workers. Of course, redistribution within insurance schemes 
differs substantially from one country to another and sometimes the differences are so great 
between countries that it is scarcely possible to classify them in the same group. 
 
Table 1 shows that the existing UI in many OECD countries involves an upper limit or ceiling 
on insurable earnings. There is a fixed compensation rate up to a certain income level; above 
this level, the maximum, benefits are fixed. This means that the actual replacement rate is 
lower for employees with earnings exceeding the maximum level
16; this rate can be much 
lower than the maximum rates.
17 Put another way, the wage replacement rate decreases as the 
level of earnings rises. As a corollary some proportion of the unemployed receive the UI 
benefit at the same level. 
 
This fact creates some interesting questions that appear to have received little or no attention 
in the economic literature. What is the optimal structure of replacement rates in a world with 
heterogeneous labour? Consider an economy with two types of workers, one more productive 
and therefore with higher wage. Should these two types have the same replacement rate or  
                                                                 
15 There are some other common features in addition to these characteristics. One of the fundamental 
characteristics of social insurance, including unemployment insurance, is that it promotes solidarity principle, 
i.e., unlike private insurance, UI is a pooling of risks without differentiating contributions according to exposure 
to risk. Moreover, the state, employers and workers finance generally UI.  
16 In Sweden, for example, 75 percent of all full-time employees had an income above the ceiling in 1996. See 
SOU (1996). 
17 According to SOU (1996), employees with monthly earnings exceeding 25000 SEK in 1996 had a replacement 
rate lower than 50 percent of the lost income.    6
should one type have a higher benefit level? Is it possible to rationalise the empirical pattern 
we observe, i.e., a system where low-income workers have higher replacement rates? Can 
such a system be rationalised on efficiency grounds? Or do we need to invoke distribution 
arguments?         
 
Table 1. UI Systems Around the World 
                     Replacement Rate (%)                 Maximum Benefit  
           
Australia    _      _ 
Austria    57      Yes 
Belgium    60      Yes 
Canada    55      Yes 
Czech Republic   60      Yes 
Denmark    90      Yes 
Finland    90      Yes 
France    75      Yes 
Germany    60      Yes 
Greece    40      Yes 
Hungry    65      Yes 
Iceland    Flat      Yes 
Ireland    Flat      Yes 
Italy    80      Yes 
Japan    80      Yes 
Korea    Flat      Yes 
Luxembourg    80      Yes 
Netherlands    70      Yes 
New Zealand    _      _ 
Norway    62.4      Yes 
Poland    Flat      Yes 
Portugal    65      Yes 
Spain    70      Yes 
Sweden    80      Yes 
Switzerland    70      Yes 
United Kingdom  Flat      Yes 
United States    50      Yes 
Notes: Australia and New Zealand have an assistance type benefit with characteristics of both unemployment 
assistance and social assistance.  
 
Source: OECD (1999).   7
3. The Framework of Analysis 
3.1 The Labour Market 
Consider an economy with two separate sectors, indexed  2 , 1 = i . One sector  ( ) 1 = i  employs 
exclusively workers with relatively low productivity; the other sector ( ) 2 = i  employs workers 
with high productivity. There is no search on the job since we assume homogenous workers in 
each sector and therefore no wage differentials within sectors. The total number of workers is 
fixed and normalised to unity in each sector. 
 
 The number of jobs is variable and determined by zero-profit conditions. Firms produce 
according to a constant returns to scale technology. As usual, we simplify by focusing on 
“small” firms with only one job. At any point in time, a fraction  i u - 1 of the labour force in 
sector  i is employed while the remaining fraction  i u  is unemployed and searching for a job. 
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals, and time is continuous. 
 
Existing jobs are destroyed at the exogenous Poisson rate  i f . This creates an inflow into the 
unemployment pool that is equal to the outflow in equilibrium. There are frictions in the 




Unemployed workers are immediately eligible for UI benefits when they enter unemployment 
and benefit payment is indefinite. These assumptions are made for tractability. Benefits are 
provided by the government and are funded by taxing all workers’ incomes, both employed 
and unemployed.  
 
Let  i s  denote search intensity. Thus, the effective number of searchers in a sector is given by 
i i i u s S = . The matching function, which captures the frictions in the market, relates the flow 
of new hires,  i H , to the number of effective searchers and the number of vacant jobs,  i v , i.e., 
) , ( i i i v S H H = . It is assumed increasing in both its arguments, continuously differentiable, 
concave, and homogenous of degree one.
19  
                                                                 
18 The sources of the frictions are costs and time delays, associated with imperfect information about the location 
of job and job characteristics, in the process of finding trading partners. 
19 Empirical research suggests also a constant returns matching technology (see Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001)).   8
 Let  i i i S v / ” q  denote labour market tightness and  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , / 1 / , i i i i i i i H v v S H q q q = =  
denote the rate at which vacant jobs become filled, so  ( ) i q q / 1  is the expected time until a 
vacant job will be filled. Further, by the properties of matching technology,  ( ) 0 < ¢ i q q : the 
tighter the labour market, the more difficult for a firm to fill a vacancy. Finally, the elasticity 
of  ( ) i q q  is denoted by  ( ) ( ) i i i q q q q q s / ¢ - ” , where  ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ s . 
 
Unemployed workers enter employment at the endogenous rate  ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i u s v u s H s s / , = q a  
and  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i H u s v u s H q q a , 1 / , = = , where. Moreover,  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 > - = ¢ i i q q s q a . Thus 
the more vacancies the easier for workers to find jobs and the more unemployed workers the 
easier for firms to fill their vacancies. In steady state the flow into unemployment equals the 
flow out of unemployment. Thus, flow equilibrium implies  ( ) ( ) i i i i i u u s - = 1 f q a which can 
be rewritten as follows 
 







=             2 , 1 = i                                                     (1) 
                                              
 
Equation (1) is one of the key equations of the model. It implies a negative relationship 
between search effort and unemployment rate. The other source of variation in unemployment 
is  i q , which can be seen as a measure of labour market conditions. 
 
3.2 The Behaviour of Workers 
The two types of workers are matched in two separate labour markets. The employed workers 
can affect the equilibrium outcome because they bargain over the wage rate. The unemployed 
workers can influence the exit rate to employment and equilibrium unemployment through 
their search effort. Workers have utility functions that are strictly concave in wage income 
( ) i w  and leisure. The instantaneous utility of unemployed workers is decreasing in search 
effort, since search reduces available leisure time. The utility function for the employed 
worker is  ( ) ( ) i i i i w h w u u = , , where  h, hours of work, is exogenously fixed. The unemployed 
workers utility is given by  ( ) i i i s B , = u , where  i B  is the benefit level. The worker’s utility 
function is assumed to be logarithmic:   9
 
  i i i c l ln ln g u + =        2 , 1 = i                                   (2) 
 
where  i c  denotes consumption and  i l  leisure. Workers do not have access to a capital 
market, so consumption equals income at each instant. Let T  denotes available time and  i t  
the tax rate, thus, the consumption and leisure in the two states are given by  ) 1 ( i i i w c t - =  
and  h T i - = l  if employed;  ) 1 ( i i i B c t - =  and  i i s T - = l  if unemployed. Thus, the 
employed worker’s time is divided between work and leisure, whereas the unemployed 
worker’s time is divided between search and leisure. The utility function can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) h T w i i
e
i - + - = ln 1 ln g t u  and  ( ) ( ) i i i i
u
i s T w b - + - = ln 1 ln g t u , where superscripts eand 
u refer to employed and unemployed. We have assumed  i i i w b B = , where  i b  is the 
replacement rate. Thus benefit levels are indexed to (average) wages within each sector.  
 
The value functions can now be defined. Let  i E  and  i U  be the expected present values of 
employment and unemployment, respectively, and let  r  denote the subjective rate of time 
preference. Thus, the value functions can be written as follows: 
( ) i i i
e
i i U E rE - - = f u                                                                                         (3) 
  ( )( ) i i i i
u
i i U E s rU - + = q a u                                                                             (4) 
 
The unemployed worker chooses search effort to maximise the value of unemployment. The 
first-order condition takes the form: 
 
  ( ) 0 = - +
-











( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) i i i






i i s r













ln 1 ln ln 1 ln
             (6) 
   10 
is the difference in present values between employment and unemployment. Equation (5) says 
that, in optimum, the marginal cost of increasing search activity is equal to its expected 
marginal gain. The first term in (5) captures the marginal cost, i.e., reduced available leisure 
time. Higher search effort increases the marginal cost of search by reducing the available 
leisure time. The second term captures the gain in utility, i.e. higher probability of a change of 
states, from unemployment to employment. Note also that the second-order condition holds, 
0 < Y
i s . There is not any relationship between the wage and search effort;  0 = Y
i w , since 
i i U E -  is independent of the wage, an implication of the chosen functional form. Moreover, 
i i U E -  is independent of the tax rate.  Finally, an increase in the replacement rate reduces  i s , 
since i i U E - is decreasing in  i b .  
 
3.3 Firm Behaviour and Wage Determination 
 The number of jobs is endogenous and determined by profit maximising firms. Labour 
productivity is denoted by  i y . The firm bears a fixed vacancy cost  i ky , with  0 > k  equal 
across sectors. Workers arrive to vacant jobs according to a Poisson process at the rate  ) ( i q q . 
Wages are chosen by a Nash-bargaining rule. Assuming a perfect capital market with fixed 
interest rate  r , letting  i J  denote the expected present value of an occupied job and  i V  the 
expected present value of a vacant job, the flow values are as follows: 
 
( ) i i i i i V J q ky rV - + - = ) (q                                                             (7) 
( ) i i i i i i V J w y rJ - - - = f                                                              (8) 
 
Equation (7) says that the expected flow value of a vacancy is equal to the expected capital 
gain from finding a worker minus the vacancy cost. Likewise, equation (8) shows that the 
expected value of an occupied job is equal to the flow profit from a filled job minus the 
expected capital loss if the match is dissolved. 
 
In the environment of this model with profit maximising firms in a competitive market, the 
free entry of new vacancies ensures that the supply of vacant jobs in equilibrium involves 
0 = i V , i.e., profit maximisation implies that employers create jobs until the expected return of   11 
a vacancy is equal to zero. Now, a zero-profit condition for firm entry can be derived from 
equations (7) and (8): 
 














=                                                                    (9) 
 
Equation (9) states that in equilibrium, market tightness is such that the expected cost of 
hiring a worker is equal to the expected profit from a new job. If  i w  rises, the number of 
vacant jobs, and thus  i q , falls. We can now derive the wage cost as a function of the 
productivity of labour, i.e., 














f 1                                                           (10) 
 
Equation (10) shows a negative relationship between the real producer wage and labour 
market tightness. The lower the tightness, the higher the wage cost for the firm and vice versa. 
Condition (10) can therefore represent a downward-sloping “labour demand curve” in a  i i w q ,  
space.  i y  is the marginal product of labour and ( ) ( ) i i i q ky r q f / +  is the firm’s expected hiring 
cost. Equation (10) can also be thought as demand wage. The elasticity of the demand wage 
with respect t o tightness is given as  0 ) / 1 ( ln / ln < - = i i i i w y d w d s q . Note that this 
elasticity approaches zero as  0 ﬁ s , a special case that corresponds to an infinitely elastic 
labour demand schedule.   
 
The Nash bargaining problem is 
 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
b b - - - = L
1 max i i i i i i i i
w
V w J U w E w
i
                                                 (11) 
 
Equation (11) states that the surplus from a job match would be shared between the firm and 
the worker according to a fixed parameter,  ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ b . The surplus enjoyed by firms is  i J  in 
equilibrium with  0 = i V , while worker’s surplus is  i i U E - . The first-order conditions for 
maximisation of Nash product with respect to  i w  have the following structure:   12 
 











                                                                      (12) 
 
The worker’s surplus is, according to (12), increasing in its bargaining power and decreasing 
in the firm’s wage cost. Further, the first-order condition indicates that the value of a job 
match is positive in equilibrium, since both the worker’s and the firm’s surplus are positive 
according to equations (9) and (12), and equal to the expected cost of search and hiring. Thus, 
there exists a pure economic rent when a job becomes occupied and this rent is shared 
between the worker and the firm according to a Nash-bargaining rule.   
 
Substituting (3), (4), (9), (10) and the employed and unemployed workers’ utility functions 
into (12), we can derive a wage equation as a function of labour market tightness. The 
equation can be written as follows: 

















w                                               (13)        
 
where  ( ) i i i i s b A - - - = 1 ln ln ln g g l . Equation (13) states that a tighter labour market 
increases the wage rate through worker’s bargaining power. A tighter labour market improves 
worker’s position and their bargaining strength, which results in higher wage rate. As a result, 
this equation represents the upward-sloping “wage setting curve” in  i i w q ,  space. 
 
 
3.4 Equilibrium  
 
The general equilibrium of the model is given by the simultaneous satisfaction of the four 
equilibrium conditions (1), (5), (10) and (13), recognising (6). It can be shown that the 
equilibrium is unique. To determine tightness, use the free-entry condition (10) and the wage 
equation (13): 
 
  ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
1
1 = + +
-











f                              (14)   13 
 
where  0 = s G , a property implied by optimal search behaviour. Given tightness, equation (5) 
determines search behaviour. With tightness and search determined, equation (1) gives 
unemployment. Finally, taxes can be determined once wages and unemployment are 
determined. The government’s budget constraint takes the form: 
 
  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 w b u w b u w b u w u w b u w u + = + - + + - t t  
 
Note that  1 2 y y >  implies  1 2 w w >  for  2 1 b b =  and  2 1 f f = . Equation (14) implies that 
labour market tightness is independent of the tax rate and productivity in equilibrium. The 
same result can be shown for search effort, i.e., a change in labour productivity or tax rate 
does not affect search effort even though changes in productivity affect wages. It means also, 
by using (1), that equilibrium unemployment is independent of the level of productivity and 
the tax rate. 
 
However, a higher replacement rate,  i b , reduces labour market tightness through a higher 
wage. To see this, differentiate (14) implicitly to get  0 <
i Gq  and  0 <
i b G . A rise in the 
worker’s bargaining power,  b , has a similar effect for similar reasons. It is also obvious that 
an increase in the separation rate,  i f , or a higher vacancy cost, k , decreases tightness. 
 
4. The Optimal Structure of Replacement Rates 
Consider a social welfare function of utilitarian form, that is 
 
( ) [ ] i i i i
i
rU u rE u W + - =S 1  
 
To compare different steady state without considering the adjustment process, let the discount 
rate approach zero, i.e.  0 ﬁ r , and substitute the value functions into the welfare function. 
We get an expression for social welfare that is simplified to a weighted average of workers’ 
instantaneous utilities: 
 







v u v u W W + - = = S S 1    14 
 
4.1 Paretoefficiency 
Let us first examine a Pareto efficient UI policy by maximising the expected utility of agent 1, 
given the expected utility of agent 2. Rewrite the utilitarian welfare function: 
 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i H w b u w u W + - + - - ” t t 1 ln 1 ln 1  
          ( ) i i i i i H b u w + + - + = ln 1 ln ln t                                                                (15) 
 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i s T u h T u H - + - - ” ln ln 1 g g  captures the leisure components. The budget 
restriction is  
 
 
  ( ) [ ] { } 0 1
2 , 1
= - + - ” W S
=
i i i i i i i i
i
w b u w b u u t                                                       (16) 
 
Let  Ldenote the value of the Lagrangian and  m  the Lagrange multiplier on the utility 
constraint, and  l  the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. The Lagrangian for this 
problem is 
 
  W + - + = l m ) ( 2 1 R W W L                                                                             (17)     
 
where  R is a given “promised” welfare for high-skilled workers. Differentiating with respect 
to each of the choice variables gives us the first-order conditions: 
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    0 = W =
l d
dL
                                                                                (22) 
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- - - - - - + =
g
g g  (24) 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
i
i
i i i i i i i i
i
i
i i i i i
i db
dw












- + + - - =
W
1 1 t t t t       (25) 
 
If  2 1 b b = , then  2 2 1 1 / / db dW db dW = , an implication of (10) and the fact that tightness, 
search and unemployment are independent of productivity. Note also that  0 2 = - ” F R W  
defines an implicit function  0 ) , , ( 2 2 = F R b t  with the partial derivatives  2 2 1 /db dW = F , 
0 2 < F  and  1 3 - = F . Consider a case where each group finances its own UI, the case of 
“autarky”. This implies that  i i i i i i u b b u u = + - ) 1 ( t , which means that the tax rates are 
independent of the wage rates. We obtain the following result: 
 
Lemma 1. The optimal system involves identical replacement rates and thus identical taxes, if 
each group finances its own benefits. 
Proof. Differentiate equation (15) with respect to  i b , recognising  i i i i i i u b b u u = + - ) 1 ( t , we 
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Equation (26) says that, in optimum, the welfare cost of increasing tax rates is equal to the 
welfare gain from a rise in the replacement rate. The right hand side term in (26) captures the 
welfare cost implied by the associated tax increase, whereas the left hand side term captures 
the welfare gain from a rise in the replacement rate. Inspecting (26) and recognising (24) 
implies that  2 1 b b =  is optimal, since labour productivity does not enter the expression. Thus, 
we have  2 1 t t =  since  2 1 u u =  at  2 1 b b = . QED. 
 
Let  *
i W  denote the expected utility of a type  i worker under autarky. Note that  *
1
*
2 W W >  
since high productivity workers enjoy higher consumption levels. We can establish the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 1. (i) For  *
2 W R = , benefit differentiation is not optimal. (ii) For  *
2 W R < , benefit 
differentiation, i.e.,  2 1 b b > , is optimal provided that a benefit rise reduces the wage bill.  
Proof. Note that  2 2 1 1 / / db dW db dW =  at  b b b = = 2 1  and suppose that (18) holds and 
consider the change in welfare arising from an increase in  2 b : 
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It follows from (19), (20), (21) and  u u u = = 2 1 at  b b b = = 2 1  that  ( )











= . This 
implies:   17 
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where we have used the fact that  db w d db w d db w d / ln / ln / ln 2 1 = = . From 
0 ) , , ( 2 2 = F R b t  we have  2 1 t t £  as  *
2 W R £ . Hence  ( ) 0 /
2 1 2 = =b b db dL  for  *
2 W R = . For 
*
2 W R <  we have ( ) 0 /
2 1 2 < =b b db dL  if  ( ) [ ] 0 / 1 ln < - db w u d . QED. 
 
The result in (i) that benefit differentiation is not Paretoimproving is not surprising. Suppose 
an initial situation where the two groups are totally separate and each group finances its own 
UI. This results to same replacement rate. Suppose now these two groups put together their 
UI. Any distribution of replacement rate back and forth between the two groups make one 
group better off and the other worse off. Thus, the allocation cannot be Pareto efficient. 
 
Corollary 1. Benefit differentiation with  2 1 b b >  is optimal if  *
2 W R <  and the labour demand 
schedule is sufficiently wage inelastic. In particular,  0 ﬁ s  is a sufficient condition for the 
optimality of  2 1 b b >  if  *
2 W R < . 
 
Proof. Define  w u Z ) 1 ( - ”  and note that  ) / ln )( ln / ln ( / ln db d d Z d db Z d q q = , where 










































                                    (29) 
 
where  0 ln / ln > q d Z d , and thus  0 / ln < db Z d , as  0 ﬁ s . QED. Equation (29) states that 
there are two different mechanisms working in opposite directions. The bracketed expression 
captures the employment effect whereas the last term captures the wage effect. An increase in 
                                                                 
20 By using equations (1), (5), (10) and (13) we can write the wage bill as  ))] ( , ( 1 [ ) ( q q q s u Z - = . The 
function  ) (q s  is obtained by combining the first-order condition for optimal search with the Nash bargaining 
rule.     18 
the replacement rate reduces employment but it also increases the wage rate so that total effect 
on the tax base is generally ambiguous. 
 
4.2 Utilitarian Objectives 
4.2.1 Redistributive Taxation 
Let us now assume a utilitarian objective function,  2 1 W W W + ” , which is equivalent to 
1 = m . Maximise W  with respect to the policy instruments, subject to (16). Let L denote the 
Lagrangian and  l  the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The Lagrangian for 
this problem is 
 
 
  W + + = l 2 1 W W L                                                                                            (30) 
 
 
and the first-order conditions are as in (18)-(22), with  1 = m . It follows from the first-order 
conditions for  1 t  and  2 t  that the optimal tax rates imply equalisation of expected incomes: 
 
 
  ( )( ) [ ] ( )( ) [ ] 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 w b u w u w b u w u + - - = + - - t t                           (31) 
 
 
Assume that the matching functions (job arrival functions), separation rates and vacancy costs 
are equal across the sectors. It follows that  2 1 b b =  implies  2 1 u u = . In this case, we have also 
( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 1 1 w w t t - = - , implying equalisation of expected utilities across the two groups. Is it 
then optimal to equalise replacement rates? Assume that (18) holds and evaluate  2 /db dL  at 



























               ( ) ( ) 2 2 2 2 1 w u
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                 ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 w u
db
du
b b œ ß
ø
Œ º
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db
dw
ub ub u 2
2 1 - + - + t l  
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db
dw
ub ub u 1
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Proposition  2. The optimal structure of replacement rates involves  1 2 b b <   if wages are 
exogenous.  
 
Proof. Use the condition  ( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 1 1 w w t t - = -  to substitute out  2 t  from (32). The resulting 
expression takes the form: 
 
  ( ) ( ) œ ß
ø
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l                                                (33) 
 
where we have used the fact that  db w d db w d db w d / ln / ln / ln 2 1 = = . The second term in 
the square bracket disappears with exogenous wages and thus we always have  0 / 2 < db dL  in 
this case (so  2 1 b b =  cannot be optimal). QED. 
 
 The sign is unclear in the general case. Note that expression (33) can also be written as 
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l l     (34) 
 
 where  u e - =1  is the employment rate and  ew Z =  is the wage bill. Equation (34) implies 
that benefit differentiation is always optimal if labour demand elasticity is sufficiently low, 
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4.2.2 Uniform Taxation 
We have supposed so far that the government is free to choose separate tax rates for the two 
categories,  1 t  for group 1 (low skilled) and  2 t  for group 2 (high skilled). Now, we will look 
at a special case, i.e. we have a restriction on taxes: benefits are financed by a uniform 
proportional tax rate, t . The budget restriction is then 
 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 = + - + - + + - w b u w b u w b u w u w b u w u t         (35) 
 
To characterise the optimal UI policy in this case, the maximisation problem is:  
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] { } i i i i i i i
i b b
s w b u w u W - + - + + - - =￿ 1 ln 1 ln ln 1 ln 1 max
, , 2 1
g t g t
t
l                      
 
 
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 w u b w u b w b u w u w b u w u W W L - - + - + + - + + = t t t t l (36) 
 
 
Differentiating with respect to each of the choice variables gives us the first-order conditions: 
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dL ( ) ( ) [ ] 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 w u b w u b w b u w u w b u w u - - + - + + - t t t t 0 =                          (40)                                     
                                       
Should the two types have the same replacement rate or should one type have a higher benefit 
level? Assume  2 1 f f = , implying  1 2 w w >  for  1 2 y y > . The following proposition 
summarises the result: 
   21 
Proposition 3. The optimal structure of replacement rates involves  1 2 b b < . 
 
Proof. Assume that (37) holds and evaluate  2 /db dL  at  b b b = = 2 1  and obtain: 
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where (40) implies  0 = + - - ub ub u t t t . Hence   
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This implies that  2 b  is too high and should, therefore, be reduced. So, in optimum, a worker 
with higher wage should get a lower replacement rate, i.e.,  1 2 b b < . The reason for this result 
is that skilled workers’ unemployment is more costly for the government than unskilled 
workers’ (see the government’s budget constraint). A lower replacement rate leads to a lower 
unemployment rate, through higher search effort and higher tightness, and lower government 
expenditure. So, it is in government’s interest that skilled workers are employed, since they 
contribute more to tax revenues. 
 
5. Numerical Simulations 
5.1 The Benchmark 
 
To provide some information on plausible numbers and to examine whether replacement rates 
are increasing or decreasing in wages, the model is calibrated numerically. Another reason to 
do this is to resolve the ambiguity in equation (42). The day is chosen as the time unit and the 
matching function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, i.e. 
s s
i i S av H
- =
1 . We set 
1 1 = y ,  65 . 1 2 = y ; the wage differential between college and high school graduates in the 
U.S. is 1.65 in 1990 according to Katz and Autor (1999). The Hosios efficiency condition, i.e.   22 
s b = , is also imposed (see Hosios 1990). We set  5 . 0 = =s b , which is a reasonable 
approximation according to recent empirical studies of the matching function.
21  
 
The real interest rate is equal to zero and the hours of work are set to  ) 1 /( g + =T h , which is 
what the employed worker would choose to maximise utility. The model is calibrated for a 
uniform benefit system and  3 . 0 2 1 = = b b , which is also close to the average replacement rates 
in OECD countries according to Martin (1996). The remaining parameters are as follows: 
023 . 0 = a ,  72 . 0 = g ,  6 . 1 = T ,  13 . 4 = k  and  000828 . 0 2 1 = =f f , which implies an annual 
separations rate of around 30% (see Layard et al 1991).  The variables g ,  1 f ,  2 f , T and  k  
were chosen such that we obtained  1 2 1 = = s s  and  065 . 0 2 1 = = u u , which roughly matches 
the recent average rate of unemployment in United States.
22 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the simulations.
23 We have conducted two types of policy 
experiments, the optimal uniform benefit system and the optimally differentiated benefit 
system, and measure the welfare gain associated with particular policies. In all these 
experiments there is always a decrease in replacement rates associated with an increase in 
workers’ productivity. The last line of table 2 presents welfare gains associated with particular 
policies. The welfare gain has the interpretation of a consumption tax that would make the 
individual welfare across two policy regimes indifferent. The welfare gains are reported 
relative to the base run that has a replacement rate of 30%. The welfare gain is measured by 
the following equation 
 
( ) [ ] B P W c W = -x 1  
 
where  B W  represents welfare associated with the base run and  P W  is welfare associated with 
an alternative policy. We let x  denote the value of the tax rate that measures the welfare gain 




                                                                 
21 See for example Broersma and Van Ours (1999) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989). 
22See OECD (1997).  
23 All simulations in this section concern redistributive taxation. For the uniform case see appendix.   23 
Table 2. Optimal Replacement Rates with Different Tax Rates 
    3 . 0 2 1 = =b b                        2 1 b b =   2 1 b b „    
    Base Run    Optimal  Optimal 
1 2 / y y     1.650    1.650  1.650 
1 b     0.300    0.379  0.419 
2 b     0.300    0.379  0.353 
2 1/b b     1.000    1.000  1.187 
1 s     1.000    0.848  0.742 
2 s     1.000    0.848  0.906 
T s / 1     0.625    0.530  0.464 
T s / 2     0.625    0.530  0.566 
1 u     0.065    0.084  0.100 
2 u     0.065    0.084  0.076 
2 1/u u     1.000    1.000  1.316 
1 q     0.268    0.216  0.190 
2 q     0.268    0.216  0.233 
1 t                                        -0.298                                  -0.281           -0.281 
2 t                                        0.213                                   0.224             0.225 
1 W     -0.191    -0.187  -0.177 
2 W     -0.191    -0.187  -0.195 
W     -0.383    -0.374  -0.372 
x  (%)                        …    0.867  1.077 
 
 
The optimal replacement rate in a uniform system is 37.9 percent. The higher replacement 
rate reduces search effort to 0.85 and increases the unemployment rate to 8.4 percent for both 
groups. However, there is a welfare gain equal to 0.9 percent. It means that individuals would 
pay 0.9 percent of their consumption to move from the base run system to the optimal uniform 
one. They would be willing to pay even more, 1.1 percent of their consumption, in order to 
move from the base run regime to the optimally differentiated one. However, the 
unemployment rate increases for group 1 as it decreases for group 2 in the differentiated   24 
regime compared with uniform regime which is not surprising since group 1’s replacement 
rate rises but group 2’s declines. 
 
5.2 The Impact of Productivity Differences 
To see the relationship between replacement rates and workers’ productivity, w e have 
conducted an experiment. We let productivity differences between the two groups increase by 
changing the value of  2 y . Table 3 presents the results of the numerical experiments. The 
simulations imply that there is a negative relationship between replacement rates and 
individuals’ productivity. The bigger differences in productivities and wages, the bigger 
differences in replacement rates.  If  1 2 65 . 1 y y = , then  2 1 2 . 1 b b =  and when  1 2 5 . 2 y y = , we 
have  2 1 4 . 1 b b = .  
 
Table 3.The Effects of Higher Productivity Differences 
    1 b               2 b               2 1/b b        e (%)          * e (%) 
1 2 65 . 1 y y =     0.419          0.353           1.187         1.077         0.210                 
1 2 2y y =     0.439          0.344           1.276          1.297        0.431 
1 2 5 . 2 y y =     0.468        0.337             1.389          1.734         0.868 
Note: e  is the gain relative to the base run;  * e is the welfare gain relative to the optimal uniform system. 
 
5.3 The Effects of Unequal Separation Rates 
We conclude this section by analysing the case with different separation rates for each group. 
By assuming higher separation rates for low-income group, we will examine if this fact affect 
our results from table 2. We look only at the case of log utility and variables  1 f  and  2 f  are 
chosen such that we obtain  2 1 2u u = . All other parameter values are the same as in table 2. 
Table 5 shows the results of the calibrations. The benefit system with unequal separation rates 
is more generous than the system with uniform separation rates in both optimal and 
differentiated policy regimes. The optimal uniform replacement rate increases from 37.9% to 
39.8% and in the case of optimally differentiated regime from 35.3% to 35.6% for high 
income group and from 41.9% to 42.6% for low wage group. In addition, the benefit system 
becomes more differentiated when separation rates are unequal. With equal separation rates, 
we have  187 . 1 / 2 1 = b b , and with unequal separation rates  197 . 1 / 2 1 = b b . However, these 
numbers suggest that the degree of differentiation should be small. There are also welfare   25 
gains associated with switching to a differentiated benefit system. The size of these gains are 
larger than in the case with equal separation rates (see table 2 and 5).   
 
Table 4. Different Separation Rates 
    3 . 0 2 1 = =b b                        2 1 b b =   2 1 b b „    
    Base Run    Optimal  Optimal 
1 2 / y y     1.650    1.650  1.650 
1 b     0.300    0.398  0.426 
2 b     0.300    0.398  0.356 
2 1/b b     1.000    1.000  1.197 
1 s     0.997    0.797  0.712 
2 s     1.018    0.836  0.925 
T s / 1     0.623    0.498  0.445 
T s / 2     0.636    0.523  0.578 
1 u     0.070    0.097  0.113 
2 u     0.035    0.048  0.04 
1 q     0.265    0.201  0.183 
2 q     0.286    0.219  0.247 
1 t                                        -0.361                                 -0.344            -0.345 
2 t                                        0.228                                  0.238             0.239 
1 W     -0.156    -0.145  -0.136 
2 W     -0.137    -0.138  -0.145 
W     -0.293    -0.283  -0.281 
x  (%)                        …     0.969  1.153 
 
Note:  000888604 . 0 1 = f  and  000454412 . 0 2 = f . 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has considered the structure of optimal earnings-related unemployment benefits by 
developing a two-sector general equilibrium model of search unemployment. One analytical   26 
result is that an optimal insurance system implies lower replacement rates for workers with 
higher wages if taxes are uniform. The same result may hold even though taxes are 
redistributive. The numerical results suggest that there are welfare gains associated with 
switching from an optimal uniform benefit system to an optimally differentiated one in both 
cases, i.e., uniform and redistributive taxation.  
 
To gain insight into the essentials of the problem, saving has been ignored in the analysis.  
Households can not smooth consumption through borrowing or private saving in the model. 
Consumption is at the Polonius point.
24 However, an analysis of equilibrium search including 
saving would presumably make the model extremely complex.   
 
A complete welfare analysis of UI policies should also take into account the fact that 
unemployment benefits are often supplemented with family and housing benefits, which may 
affect the behaviour of all individuals in the labour market. Another component to consider in 
the analysis is the effects of eligibility rules on workers’ incentives. Existing UI system 
require a number of conditions that the unemployed must satisfy in order to receive some 
form of unemployment compensation, which means that many unemployed do not qualify for  
benefits. A third factor we should keep in mind is the possibility that high wage individuals 
may have other incentives than the benefit level to search for a job when unemployed. These 
factors may well have stronger effects on their search intensity and acceptance criteria than 




Appendix. Uniform Taxation 
To see whether replacement rates and welfare gain changes when we move from an optimal 
differentiated tax system to an optimal uniform tax system, we have also simulated the 
uniform tax model. We use the same parameter values as in table 2. The effects on 
replacement rates of switching from redistributive tax system to the uniform one seem to be 
small and negligible (compare tables 2, 3 and 4 with A1, A2 and A3).  
 
 
                                                                 
24 Hamlet, Act I, scene III; Polonius giving advice to his son, Leartes: “Neither a borrower nor a lender be: for 
loan oft loses both itself and friend; and borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.”  ( Shakespeare 1601). I owe 
this reference to Varian (1996).   27 
Table A1. Optimal Replacement Rates 
    3 . 0 2 1 = =b b                        2 1 b b =   2 1 b b „    
    Base Run    Optimal  Optimal 
1 2 / y y     1.650    1.650  1.650 
1 b     0.300    0.379  0.410 
2 b     0.300    0.379  0.350 
2 1/b b     1.000    1.000  1.171 
1 s     1.000    0.848  0.768 
2 s     1.000    0.848  0.910 
T s / 1     0.625    0.530  0.480 
T s / 2     0.625    0.530  0.569 
1 u     0.065    0.084  0.096 
2 u     0.065    0.084  0.075 
2 1/u u     1.000    1.000  1.280 
1 q     0.268    0.216  0.195 
2 q     0.268    0.216  0.234 
t                                         0.020                                  0.033            0.033  
1 W                                       -0.473                               -0.468            -0.461  
2 W     0.028    0.032  0.026 
W     -0.445    -0.436  -0.434 
x  (%)                        …    0.867  1.039 
 
 
Table A2.The Effects of Higher Productivity Differences 
    1 b               2 b               2 1/b b        e (%)          * e (%) 
1 2 65 . 1 y y =     0.410          0.350           1.171         1.039         0.172                 
1 2 2y y =     0.422          0.341           1.238          1.190        0.323 
1 2 5 . 2 y y =     0.434        0.330             1.315          1.443         0.542 
Note: e  is the gain relative to the base run;  * e is the welfare gain relative to the optimal uniform system. 
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Table A3. Different Separation Rates 
    3 . 0 2 1 = =b b                        2 1 b b =   2 1 b b „    
    Base Run    Optimal  Optimal 
1 2 / y y     1.650    1.650  1.650 
1 b     0.300    0.394  0.414  
2 b     0.300    0.394  0.353 
2 1/b b     1.000    1.000  1.173 
1 s     0.997    0.806  0.752 
2 s     1.018    0.844  0.930 
T s / 1     0.623    0.504  0.470 
T s / 2     0.636    0.528  0.581 
1 u     0.070    0.096  0.105 
2 u     0.035    0.047  0.041 
2 1/u u     2.00    2.043  2.561 
1 q     0.265    0.203  0.191 
2 q     0.286    0.221  0.249 
t                                        0.015                                   0.027             0.026 
1 W     -0.479    -0.468  -0.463 
2 W     0.107     0.106   0.101 
W     -0.372    -0.363  -0.361 
x  (%)                        …     0.972  1.104 
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